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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED STEEL WORKERS OF AMER-
ICA, LOCAL NO. 5486, et al, 
Appellants, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, 
et al, Respondents. 
Case No. 
9322 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Respondents agree v1ith the statement of appellant as to 
the nature of the case insofar as it goes and supplement it as 
follows: 
There are five categories of claims for unemployment com-
pensation benefits involved in this appeal. They are as follows: 
( 1) Claims filed for waiting weeks or weeks of unemployment 
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during periods when picketing was being maintained at the 
entrances used by the claimants; ( 2) claims filed for weeks of 
unemployment for periods which occurred after a labor-man-
agement contract had been reached when no pickets were main-
tained at the entrances used by the claimants; ( 3) claims filed 
by workers who were normally employed at the smelter after 
the completion of the processing of the stockpile at the smelter; 
( 4) claims filed by refinery workers after the date of the con-
tract settlement vtho were not called back to work due to the 
deterioration at the refinery which necessitated repair work 
prior to the resumption of normal operations; ( 5) claims filed 
by refinery workers for weeks of unemployment following the 
January shutdown of refinery furnaces. We set these out for 
the information of the Court. All classes are in our opinion 
subject to disqualification for the same reasons. 
Basically the issue is this: May the members of one union 
who participated in a simultaneous strike with members of 
several other unions escape from the disqualifying provisions 
of Section 3 5-4-5 (d) of the Employment Security Act by reason 
of the fact that through the union they reached a contract settle-
ment prior to the time when all other unions reached contract 
settlements which would permit the resumption of normal oper-
ations and an end of the work stoppage? Put another way: Can 
striking members who are responsible for a work stoppage 
become eligible for unemployn1ent compensation benefits prior 
to the end of the work stoppage when such work stoppage con-
tinues by reason of the fact that other unions are still on strike 
in one or more other segments of the establishment? 
The weeks for which unemployment benefits are claimed 
are for weeks of unemployment which occurred subsequent to 
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respective contract settlements and prior to the resumption of 
normal or substantial operations. In the case of the members 
of the international Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 
No. 1438, the claims include some claims which were for periods 
prior to the date of the contract settlement of that local but dur-
ing periods when active picketing was in progress at the en-
trance to the plant which was used by those claimants. 
Elvere R. Davis was employed as a carpenter at the com-
pany's mill and was a member of Local 392, Mine, Mill and 
Smelter Workers' Union. He originally appealed to the Referee 
on the issue of whether or not intervening employment after 
the date of the strike would relieve him from the strike dis-
qualification. Upon receiving an adverse decision, Davis filed 
a written appeal to the Board of Review on the sole issue of 
whether or not members of Local 392, Mine, Mill and Smelter 
Workers' Union including himself were eligible for benefits. 
He did not appeal on the issue of the intervening employment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Appeals Referee in his decisions and particularly in 
those involving steelworker locals and mine mill locals made 
very comprehensive Findings of Fact. BR-230 (R. 011, 012), 
BR-231 (R. 008, 009), BR-235 (R. 027, 028), BR-236 (R 102-
108), BR-23 7 (R. 82-86). His Findings appear to be accepted by 
all parties to this appeal with perhaps only minor differences 
v1hich are of little consequence. Nowhere in appellant's brief 
do they point out where any of these Findings of Fact are not 
supported by the evidence. 
Under the heading, nStaten1ent of the Case," appellants 
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in their brief set forth certain facts. Respondents agree generally 
with the statement of facts therein set forth but call attention 
to what appears to be statements made in error and not sup-
ported by the record and direct attention to additional facts. 
While the Electrical Workers Local 1438, as set forth on 
page 5 of appellants' brief, advised the Company on October 31, 
1959, that it was not on strike and in turn ordered the Unity 
Council not to list that local as one of the striking unions in 
either their advertisements, publicity or demands to the Com-
pany. This same union had, by press release dated August 12, 
1959, two days after the commencement of the strike, identified 
itself as one of the unions in Utah Unity Council which had 
that day ((established a joint strike committee for the purpose 
of uniting the efforts of all striking local unions in the Utah 
Division in a combined effort to win this strike and effectuate 
a substantial contract from the Company***." BR-235 (R. 
004) . The union, prior to the commencement of the strike on 
August 10, 1959, had been requested by the Company to fur-
nish men to maintain the power plant during the strike and 
supply switchboard operators. These men did not show up for 
work on the day of the strike and thereafter until November 
12, 1959. The members of the union refused to cross the picket 
lines to go to work. BR-235 (R. 071). 
The Central Power Station was not operated during the 
strike not only for the reason that it was not economically 
feasible to operate the plant for the production of the relatively 
small amount of power which was needed by the Company 
in its strike-curtailed operation, but also because it was unsafe 
to do so for such a small output. BR-236 (R. 070, 183, 184). 
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While it is true that as stated on page 9 of appellants· 
brief that when pickets appeared at the smelter on the afternoon 
shift of Decen1ber 1, 1959, the smelter employees did not leave 
their jobs, the production workers merely finished the shift 
they were then working and refused thereafter to cross the picket 
line to return to work on subsequent shifts and did not return 
to \Vork until the picket lines were withdrawn. The clerical 
workers returned after only one day of absence and refusal to 
cross the picket line. 
The Utah Copper Division of Kennecott Copper Corpora-
tion is engaged in Salt Lake County in the mining, milling, 
smelting and refining business. It operates a mine and precipita-
tion plant at Bingham, two concentration plants (mills at 
lviagna and Arthur), a smelter, a refinery, a Central Power 
Station all near Magna and a vast railroad system; at the mine, 
from the mine to the waste dumps, from the mine to assembly 
yards, from the assembly yards to the mills and connecting the 
mills, smelter and refinery. BR-236 (R. 119). 
The basis or foundation of all activity in the Utah Copper 
Division is its open-cut mine at Bingham Canyon. 
Before ore can be removed from the mine, waste or over-
burden of about twice the amount of ore ren1oved must first be 
removed and hauled to \vaste dumps. BR-236 (R. 025, Page 10, 
Exhibit B), BR-237 (R. 137). Over these v;aste dumps water 
is distributed and permitted to percolate through them, in the 
process picking up copper from the waste in the dumps. At the 
base of the dumps the water is recaptured and taken to the 
precipitation plant at the mouth of Bingham Canyon where 
the copper is ren1oved therefrom. BR-237 (R. 137). 
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Ore from the mine is loaded by electric shovels into railroad 
cars and taken by train from the mine to the assembly yard and 
at the assembly yard a larger number of cars are assembled to-
gether for transporting by railroad to the mills. The ore is proc-
essed at the mills and the concentrates taken from there to the 
smelter by railroad, and after smelting, the product is then 
taken by railroad to the refinery for refining. BR-236 (R. 127), 
BR-237 (R. 137). 
Each process or operation is dependent upon all of the 
others. For example, without the removal of ore from the mine, 
the train crews cannot operate. Likewise, without the train crews 
operating in any one of the areas in which they operate, i.e., 
removal of waste, moving of ore from the mine to the assembly 
yard and from the assembly yard to the mills, the mills, smelter 
and refinery cannot operate. Another example is that if the 
mine, railroads, mills and refinery are not in operation, the Cen-
tral Power Station will not operate because its sole purpose is 
to supply power used at the mine, railroads and other plants 
mentioned. 
The last of the unions to reach contract settlements with 
the Company were International Association of Machinists, 
Local 568, System Federation No. 155 and Brotherhood of 
Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, Lodge 844. Settlen1ents 
were reached on January 27, 1960. BR-236 (R. 029). 
The employees represented by the International Associa-
tion of Machinists, Local 568, are the maintenance group at 
the mine who maintain the equipment which is used by the 
various units throughout the open-pit mine. They maintain the 
shovels, locomotives, track shifters, angle dozers, trucks and 
other equipment used in the operation of the mine. Without 
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the services of the men represented by this union, there could 
be operation only for a short time before breakdowns woulJ 
stop the operation. BR-237 (R. 138). 
'fhe System Federation No. 15 5 compnses a group of 
labor unions, members of which are machinists, blacksmiths, 
boiler makers and the car repairmen located in the shops of the 
ore haulage at the Magna mills. These men service and main-
tain the railroad operating equipment, including the electric 
locomotives which haul the ore and service the dumping of the 
ore and the diesel locomotives which haul the concentrates 
from the mills to the smelter and the delivery of supplies. With-
out the services of these men, it would be impossible to operate 
the mills. BR-237 (R. 148, 149). 
The men represented by the Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen and Enginemen operate the trains in the Bingham 
open-pit mine. They travel to the shovels and haul waste to the 
dumps and ore to the Copperton assembly yard. Without the 
services of these men, there would be no move1nent of waste 
or ore. BR-237 (R. 137, 138). 
The n1anagement, operation, direction and control of all 
departments is on a Utah Copper Division basis with head-
quarters in Salt Lake City in most instances and generally in 
the Kearns Building. There is a general manager with offices 
in the Kearns Building, Salt Lake City. BR-236 (R. 120). Under 
him there are the superintendents of the mine, mills, refinery 
and smelter with offices at the respective plants. There is a 
central accounting office in Salt Lake City which handles the 
accounting for all the plants. BR-236 (R. 121). Payroll checks 
are made up in the central accounting office for all employees 
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of Utah Copper Division. The Comptroller's Department, In-
dustrial and Union Relations Department, Purchasing Depart-
ment, Engineering Department, Industrial Engineering Depart-
ment, Quality Control Department, Safety Department and 
Security Force are all on a Utah Copper Division basis. BR-236 
(R. 121, 138, 139). 
The important fact concerning the stoppage of production 
at the smelter after it had resumed production upon the settle-
ment reached with the steelworkers on November 21, 1959, 
which stoppage commenced during the week ending January 
10, 1960, was that there were no more concentrates at the smelter 
to process and none was being received from the mills, which 
lack of concentrates was the result of the strike which had com-
tnenced on August 10, 1959. There had been about 34,000 tons 
of concentrates stockpiled at the smelter prior to the strike. 
When these concentrates were smelted, operations were forced 
to cease on January 17, 1960. BR-236 (R. 162). This was not 
only the reason given, as stated by appellants on page 10 of their 
brief, but was the fact and there was no evidence to the con-
trary. 
The resumption of operations at the refinery, following 
the contract settlements with the United Steelworkers of Amer-
ica on November 21, 1959, first consisted of preliminary heating 
of furnaces, clearing up fallen cathodes and general cleanup in 
the tank house. Operations were planned to resume as rapidly 
as possible with fine casting being scheduled to begin on 
December 7, 1959. Picket lines of Brotherhood of Locomotive 
Firemen and Enginemen and Order of Railroad Carmen and 
Brakemen were established on December 1, 1959. This inter-
rupted operations again until December 25, 1959, when the 
10 
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pickets v;ere withdra\vn. There was a limited supply of materials 
on hand for refining and this was depleted on January 15, 
1960. BR-236 (R. 144). The failure of Systems Federation and 
the Company to reach agreement prior to January 27, 1960, 
prevented the product of the stnelter from being delivered to 
the refinery, which product was necessary before the refinery 
could operate. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR AS l1. 
MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN DENYING THE 
CLAIMANTS BENEFITS IN HOLDING: 
1. THAT UTAH COPPER DIVISION, KENNECOTT 
COPPER CORPORATION, OPERATION IN UTAH 
CONSTITUTES A SINGLE FACTORY OR ESTABLISH-
MENT WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ACT, 
SECTION 5(d). 
2. THAT THE WORI< STOPPAGE DID NOT END 
UNTIL FEBRUARY 6, 1960, WHEN THE PLANT 
RESUMED ((NORMAL OPERATIONS" FOR: 
(a) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY UNITED 
STEELWORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 5486; 
(b) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTER-
NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRI-
CAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1438; 
(c) TI-IE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTER-
II 
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NATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND 
SMELTER WORKERS, LOCALS 485 AND 392; 
(d) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTER-
NATIONAL UNION OF OFFICE EMPLOYEES, 
LOCAL 286; 
(e) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY UNITED 
STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCALS 4329, 
4347, 4413 AND 5120; AND 
(f) EL VERE R. DAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS 
A MEMBER OF HIS LOCAL UNION. 
3. THAT THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIM-
ANTS REPRESENTED BY THE LOCAL UNIONS SET' 
FORTH IN 2. (a through£ above) WAS DUE TO A 
WORK STOPPAGE WHICH EXISTED BECAUSE OF A 
STRIKE INVOLVING HIS GRADE, CLASS, OR GROUP 
OF WORKERS AT THE FACTORY OR ESTABLISH-
MENT AT WHICH HE IS OR WAS LAST EMPLOYED. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR AS A 
MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN DENYING THE 
CLAIMANTS BENEFITS IN HOLDING: 
1. THAT UTAH COPPER DIVISION, KENNECOTT 
COPPER CORPORATION, OPERATION IN UTAI-I 
CONSTITUTES A SINGLE FACTORY OR ESTABLISH-
12 
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t\lENT \\liTHIN TI-IE MEANING OF THE ACT, 
SECTION 5(d). 
SECTION 3 5-4-5 (d) of the Utah Employment Security 
Act provides: 
(I 5. An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or 
for purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
n (d) For any week in which it is found by the COITl-
mission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage 
of \vork \vhich exists because of a strike involving his 
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or 
establishment at which he is or was last employed. 
n ( 1) If the commission, upon investigation, shall 
find that a strike has been fomented by a v;-orker of 
any employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, 
or group of workers of the individual who is found 
to be a party of such plan or agreement to foment a 
strike, shall be eligible for benefits; provided, however, 
that if the commission, upon investigation, shall find 
that such strike is caused by the failure or refusal of 
any employer to conform to the provisions of any law 
of the State of Utah, or the United States, pertaining 
to hours, wages or other conditions of work, such strike 
shall not render the workers ineligible for benefits. 
n ( 2) If the commission upon investigation, shall 
find that the employer, his agent, or representative, 
has conspired, planned or agreed with any of his work-
ers, their agents or representatives, to foment a strike, 
such strike shall not render the workers ineligible fo ~ 
benefits.'' 
The question of whether or not the Utah Copper Division, 
Kennecott Copper Corporation, operations in Utah constitute 
a single factory or establishment within the meaning of the 1\ct 
appears to us to be of secondary importance except as to the 
13 
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effect such interpretation has on the matter or resumption of 
normal or substantial operations at the smelter or refinery. 
The matter of what constitutes a single factory or establish-
ment has never been decided by this Court under a similar fac-
tual situation. This Court did say in the case of Olof Nelson 
Construction Company et al vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 
121 Utah 525, 243 P 2d 951, in a case which involved multiple 
bargaining units: 
''The strike was called for and on behalf of every 
employee covered by the agreement. It, therefore, 
directly involved all these claimants at each particular 
place of employment at which they were last em-
ployed. The strike was fomented by claimants through 
their duly authorized union representatives." 
Although the facts show that at times each of the local 
unions presented certain common bargaining demands in the 
field of health and welfare benefits through a "Unity Council," 
the Referee and the Board of Review did not make specific 
findings that the various strike actions were taken to enforce the 
specific health and welfare demands of the Unity Council. It 
was recognized that except in the area of health and welfare 
benefits the designated unions were the sole bargaining agents 
for the respective units. It is significant that the respective local 
unions all effected a strike simultaneously on August 10. 
We have reviewed numerous cases involving the definitions 
of single factory or establishment and in none of these cases 
are the facts parallel to the situation in the instant case. Had 
the facts in the other cases paralleled those in the instant case, 
the matter of whether or not a certain plant was part of the 
factory or establishment would not have been the salient factor 
14 
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in the appeal. In the other cases there were no formal strikes 
at the premises where the benefit claimants were employed. In 
the instant case there were simultaneous strikes at each and 
every segment of the company operations. In the other cases 
the claims dated from the original work stoppage which came 
about by reason of the lack of materials flowing from the struck 
premises which were located at some distance from the struck 
operation. In the instant case the claims for benefits are made 
for \veeks either during which time strikes were in active prog-
ress and picketing was being maintained or for weeks which 
followed a settlement of the particular local's contract. 
As we pointed out, in the other cases the work stoppage 
resulted from a lack of materials and in the instant case the 
work stoppage was a direct result of the strike of August 10. 
Generally speaking, in the other cases the appeals involved out-
of -state plants or plants which were forty or more miles distant. 
In the instant case the operation constitutes one industrial com-
munity-it is all within the state and within a limited integrated 
area. In the cases to be reviewed there was no voluntary act on 
the part of the employees who were appealing, and in the instant 
case all of the appellants or benefit claimants were either ac-
tive! y on strike on August 10 or were honoring picket lines and 
thereby involved in the strike. In the other cases there was no 
showing that there was a direct interest or direct participation 
by the appellants. In the instant case each of the appellants was 
a participating and interested party. 
The foregoing factual analysis applies in almost all respects 
to the case of Park vs. Appeal Board of Michigan, decided on 
January 12, 1959, 359 Michigan 103, 94 N.W. 2d 407, which 
case is relied on to a substantial extent by Counsel for the Appel-
15 
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I ants in his brief. That case held in substance that the '' func-
tiona! integration" of an employer's plants that are located in 
more than one state does not make the plant per se a "single 
establishment'' within the meaning of the Law and that, there-
fore, the employees who were out of work in Michigan as a 
result of a strike against their employer in Ohio were not dis-
qualified under the labor dispute provisions of the Law where 
such employees did not strike or picket but were laid off. The 
Court stated in discussing the question at issue: 
~~ ... We conclude that they turn upon the answer 
to a relatively simple legal question-does the term 
'the establishment' as used in the Michigan Employ-
ment Security Act encompass both Ford plants in the 
vicinity of Detroit, Michigan, and the Ford Forge plant 
at Canton, Ohio, for the reason that the former cannot 
operate long without the latter." 
To further point out that the Court recognized differences 
tn factual situations in its rationalization of other cases, we 
quote: 
('While the dictionary, the statute, and common sense 
all argue otherwise, we are urged that this Court ·in 
Chrysler Corporation vs. Smith, 297 Michigan 438, so 
defined (establishment' as to require our holding as 
did the Circuit Judge and the Appeal Board that the 
Ford Detroit area plants in Michigan and the Ford 
Canton Forge plant in Ohio were all one (establish-
ment'. 
('It might be noted at the outset that no such factual 
situation was involved in Chrysler vs. Smith as con-
fronts us here. The plants there involved were all in 
one industrial community-the Detroit area; they \Y~re 
all located within eleven miles of one another; and they 
were all located in the State of Michigan. We deal 
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here with a disqualification argument applicable to 
nonstriking employees in three Detroit area plants 
all in Michigan where the strike inducing the unem-
ployment occurred in another community 150 miles 
away and in another state." 
The Court discussed the case of Spielmann vs. Industrial 
CommiJsion, 236 Wisconsin 240, 295 N.W. 1, and said in 
answer to the Ford Motor Company's argument: 
"Factually the Wisconsin case was even more remote 
from our present facts since the two plants there held 
to be one 'establishment' within the meaning of the 
Wisconsin statute were both in the same state though 
forty miles apart, were both under one general works 
manager, and were operated on one production schedule 
maintained by trucks scheduled between the two plants 
with deliveries so synchronized that a body built for 
one order at Milwaukee would meet the chasis for the 
same order built at Kanosha on the assembly line with-
out intermediate storage. 
''On the other hand, the record in the cases considered 
herewith indicates for all plants concerned entirely 
separate and distinct plant managers and plant produc-
tion schedules as well as separate and distinct indus-
trial relations and employment offices, employment 
seniority lists, local unions and local labor management 
agreements.'' 
In the instant case we have one industrial community, i.e., 
the Utah Copper Division where the administration of the pro-
duction operations is carried on under the General Manager 
of the Division with a Superintendent of Mines, Superintendent 
of Mills, Refinery Supervisor, Smelter Supervisor and Super-
intendent of the auxiliary units including the power station, 
precipitation plant and ore haulage system reporting directly 
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to the General Manager. The Utah Division consists of the 
open-pit mine separated only by a few miles from the two 
mills, refinery, precipitation plant, central power stations with 
a general company-owned haulage system operating between 
all segments of the operations. The Utah Division maintains 
a central accounting office tn Salt Lake City, and all of the 
various plant operations and all payroll records and checks for 
all employees of the Utah Division are made up in this central 
accounting section in Salt Lake City. The purchasing, industrial 
and union relations, employment and employee training, engi-
neering, quality control, safety, security, and production sched-
ules all emanate from a central point in the division headquar-
ters in Salt Lake City. As in the Spielmann case referred to in 
the Park case supra, the operations at all of the segments of the 
establishment are so integrated as to make the continuous flow 
of production each dependent upon the other. A stoppage of 
the flow of ore from the mine to the mills or a stoppage in the 
ore haulage operation would inunediately shut down the entire 
establishment including the mine, the mills, the smelter and the 
refinery. 
The appellants in their brief, pages 16 through 18, point 
out how in their opinion certain factors governing contracts, 
wages, etc., show the separateness of the segments of the oper-
ations of the Utah Division. In relating the argument to the 
situation at hand, we find that the facts are neither black nor 
white. The United Steelworkers of America negotiates contracts 
for Local 4413, production and maintenance workers at the 
refinery; Local 5120, clerical workers at the company's refinery; 
Local 4347, production and maintenance workers at the com-
pany smelter; Local 4329, clerical workers at the smelter; and 
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Local 5486, technical workers at the company's Arthur Mills. 
The International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers 
negotiates for Local 392, production and maintenance employees 
at the company's Arthur and Magna Mills, and Local 485, pro-
duction and maintenance workers at the company's Bingham 
Mine. The facts show that the Unity Council presented demands 
dealing with health and welfare, and these demands included 
more than one segment of the company's operations. General 
hiring practices were dictated from the company's office in Salt 
Lake City even though the actual hiring of individuals may 
have been done at the several work locations. Labor contract 
negotiations were carried out not between the administrative 
personnel of the smelter or the refinery, etc., and the unions but 
behveen the unions and the company representatives located in 
Salt Lake City. The negotiations were done with the same gen-
eral personnel for all of the segments of the operation. Safety 
and security measures in all of the operational segments were 
directed and controlled from the Salt Lake City office. There 
was one central source of payroll records and payrolls. The 
integrated nature of operations was apparently recognized by 
the various union locals themselves when they organized the 
Unity Council whose main purpose seems to have been to bring 
about some general uniformity in the provisions dealing with 
health and welfare. 
As we pointed out tn the beginning, the question of 
\vhether or not the Utah Division operations constituted one 
factory or establishment is a rather academic one in view of the 
fact that all the claimants herein were directly involved and 
participated in the strikes of August 10, which strikes were in 
effect at each and every segment of the company operations. 
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Had there been no strike at some of the work locations, then 
it would have been imperative that we determine first whether 
or not this was one establishment, and then second that we 
determine whether or not the claimants were involved in the 
strike. 
Hovv?e .. ~?e:, ~ ... :e~ taking the most liberal interpretation of 
the cases defining the word, ·'establishment,'' we do not see 
where a substantial case can be made which would support the 
conclusion that the Utah Division was anything other than a 
single establishment. Its administration and operations and 
employee matters were so functionally integrated that we fail 
to see wherein the Appeals Referee or the Board of ·Reviev· 
could have reached a different conclusion other than that within 
the meaning of the Law that this was a single "establishment.'' 
ARGUMENT 
POINT TWO I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR AS A 
MATTER OF LAW AND FACT IN DENYING THE 
CLAIMANTS BENEFITS IN HOLDING: 
2. THAT THE WORK STOPPAGE DID NOT END 
UNTIL FEBRUARY 6, 1960, WHEN THE PLANT 
RESUMED "NORMAL OPERATIONS" FOR: 
(a) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY UNITED 
STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCAL 5486; 
(b) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTER-
NATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF ELECTRI-
CAL WORKERS, LOCAL 1438; 
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(c) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTER-
NATIONAL UNION OF MINE, MILL AND 
SMELTER WORKERS, LOCALS 485 AND 392; 
(d) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY INTER-
NATIONAL UNION OF OFFICE EMPLOYEES, 
LOCAL 286; 
(e) THE WORKERS REPRESENTED BY UNITED 
STEEL WORKERS OF AMERICA, LOCALS 4329, 
4347, 4413 AND 5120; AND 
(f) ELVERE R. DAVIS, INDIVIDUALLY, AND AS 
A MEMBER OF HIS LOCAL UNION. 
We are concerned in this point of argument primarily with 
what did happen between August 10, 1959, and February 6, 
1960, with reference to resumption of operations in the Utah 
Copper Division. We reserve any argument as to cause and 
effect of the unemployment during that period to our number 
3 point of argument. The findings of the Board that the work 
stoppage did not end until February 6, 1960, can best be sup-
ported by a brief review of the facts regarding the resumption 
of work. 
Anticipating a vacation shutdown schedule which was to 
commence August 10 and end August 23, 1959, for all em-
ployees except those employed at the smelter and refinery, the 
company had stockpiled concentrates at the smelter which 
would have enabled the smelter and refinery to operate on a 
steady basis for that two-week period. When the unions' inten-
tion to strike effective August 10 was announced, the company 
canceled the vacation schedule. On November 21, 1959, follow-
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ing ratification of their new contract agreements, steelworkers 
Locals 4347 and 4329 commenced a return to work at the 
smelter to process the two-week supply of ore. Between Novem-
ber 22 and November 24, 1959, 708 smelter employees were 
back to work while 167 smelter employees were scheduled off. 
All but 96 of the 1,170 of the smelter workers had returned to 
work by November 30-BR-236 (R. 059). The smelter clerical 
employees were called back according to seniority qualifications 
as work became available. 
On the afternoon shift of December 1, 1959, pickets \vere 
established by the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and 
Enginemen and Order of Railroad Carmen and Brakemen at the 
entrance to the smelter. The smelter employees who were work-
ing at that time remained through the work shift. They did 
not, however, return to work on subsequent shifts because of the 
picket line until December 25, 1959, when the pickets were 
withdrawn by the railroad brotherhoods who had by then signed 
new contract agreements. On November 2 5 a general recall of 
the production and maintenance and clerical workers began at 
the smelter to con1plete the job of processing the stockpile. Dur-
ing the week ending January 10, 1960, the company began 
laying off the smelter workers because of the exhaustion of the 
stockpile ore. The layoffs continued according to plant seniority 
so that on January 18, 1960, there were only 242 employees 
working at the smelter and these were engaged in the work of 
maintenance, cleanup, and material inventory. Some of the 
clerical and technical employees at the smelter were told on 
January 20 not to report for work until further notice because 
there was no work available for them. Those who were laid off 
because of the exhaustion of the ore supply and lack of ,,·ork 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were subject to recall on February 1 and shortly thereafter. By 
February 4, 1960, all but 114 workers out of the 1,153 had 
returned to \vork at the smelter. We are concerned here with 
the unemployment of those workers who were not kept on to do 
available maintenance, cleanup, and material inventory. There 
was no ore available at the smelter comn1encing with the week 
ending January 10. These facts appear in the record-BR-236 
(R. 058-061) and Company Exhibits K and L. 
The situation at the refinery was somewhat different, BR-
236 (R. 040-042). The new labor agreement for the refinery 
workers was ratified on November 21, 1959. During the week 
of November 23 four hundred employees of the steelworkers 
Local 4413 were called back to work at the refinery. The remain-
ing three hundred workers were not called back. When the con1-
pany attempted to operate the refinery after November 21, they 
found that extensive repair and tnaintenance work was necessary 
before any production work could be commenced. The cathodes 
and anodes at the refinery which were in place at the end of 
the strike called on August 10 had frozen in to such an extent 
that production was not possible. Those workers who were 
not called back to work remained unemployed due to the con-
dition of the refinery. The others primarily did maintenance 
and repair work. 
On December 1, 1959, the picket lines established by the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen and Order 
of Railroad Carmen and Brakemen prevented the refinery \vork-
ers from entering the refinery. When those picket lines were 
withdrawn on December 25, the recall of the refinery workers 
commenced. BR-236 (R. 105-106). Two of the three refinery 
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furnaces were closed January 4 to January 15, 1960, with one 
continuing until January 29, 1960. Thereafter production and 
maintenance work was not resumed at the refinery until Febru-
ary 8, 1960. The last of the contract settlements was dated 
January 27, 1960, and by February 6 substantial operations had 
been resumed throughout the establishment. Reserving our 
argument for Point 3 as to cause in effect in the unemployment, 
it appears clear that there was a work stoppage existing in the 
plant which caused the unemployment of the majority of the 
workers during the period in question and the Board of Review 
could not have found otherwise. In fact, these claims for bene-
fits involved herein are based on that very work stoppage. There 
could be no resumption of normal or substantial operations 
until all of the contract negotiations had been completed since 
a holdout by one or more of the unions at any particular point 
in the production would necessarily prevent such resumption. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT THREE 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR AS A 
MATTER OF LAWT AND FACT IN DENYING THE 
CLAIMANTS BENEFITS IN HOLDING: 
3. THAT THE UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE CLAIM-
ANTS REPRESENTED BY THE LOCAL UNIONS SET 
FORTH IN 2. (a through f in point of argument No. 2) 
WAS DUE TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH 
EXISTED BECAUSE OF A STRIKE INVOLVING HIS 
GRADE, CLASS, OR GROUP OF WORKERS AT THE 
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FACTORY OR ESTABLISHMENT AT WHICH HE IS 
OR WAS LAST EMPLOYED. 
Here we come to the crux of the problem. Can claimants 
who participated in a simultaneous strike with members of 
other unions escape from the disqualification of the Act (Sec-
tions 5 (d), by reason of the fact that their union has reached a 
contract settlement prior to the time when all union members 
of all unions reached settlements which will permit the resump-
tion of normal operations. In other words, can individuals who 
create a work stoppage through the medium of a strike escape 
the responsibility for the work stoppage. In this and other states 
the principle of relating the responsibility for the work stoppage 
to the party who caused the stoppage is well settled. 
This Court in the case of Employees of Utah Fuel Company 
of Clear Creek, Utah, vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 99 
Utah 88, 104 P 2d 197, briefly considered a question of whether 
or not the stoppage of work was due to a strike or due to com-
pany action. We quote briefly from that decision: 
CtPetitioners assert that the Utah Fuel Company 
started to repair its tipple and do other construction 
work during this period in question and that the portion 
of the mine wherein work was being prosecuted was 
practically out; that therefore the company was not 
in a position to mine coal and did not have work for 
petitioners. From this they reason that the stoppage 
was not due to a strike. Whatever the facts be, we think 
them immaterial. After the company was notified and 
the men left work, it matters not what the company 
did at its mine until the dispute was settled and the 
strike over. There is no evidence that the company 
caused the stoppage of work (other than the May 4th 
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night shift already discussed). The strike caused the 
stoppage. 
((There was a conflict on whether or not the com-
pany had orders for coal and therefore would have 
mined coal, had the strike not been called. This, too, 
is immaterial. If workers walk out on a strike and 
refuse to return, except on a certain contingency, their 
unemployment is due to a strike regardless of any 
speculation or proof as to whether they would have 
been totally or partially unemployed had they not 
t k ,, s rue ... 
The reference in the above to the May 4 night shift deals 
with the fact that the company when notified that work would 
stop at midnight May 4 relied on that notice and notified the 
night shift not to come to work on May 4. 
This Court in the case of 0 I of Nelson Construction Com-
pany et al vs. Industrial Commission of Utah supra stated: 
nit cannot be doubted that the Legislature wanted to 
prevent strikes in every possible way. Undoubtedly one 
of the considerations prompted the prohibition against 
labor receiving benefits for unemployment resulting 
from a strike it was responsible for, is the fact that it 
would be unfair to use funds built up by labor and 
management jointly to support labor in a contest where-
in it was exerting economic pressure against manage-
ment by striking. Even more basic is the fact that if 
such were not the rule, the existence of the system would 
be hazarded. To permit an employee to become volun-
tarily unemployed and draw benefits would have these 
bad effects: It would tend to encourage work stoppage 
and thus bring about economic waste; it would put it 
within his power to voluntarily drain off the unem-
ployment compensation fund and thus hazard its 
soundness and the accomplishment of its purposes. If 
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it is bad for one worker to be able to voluntarily become 
unemployed and draw benefits a fortiori, it is pro-
portionately worse for greater numbers of groups to 
be able to do so. Accordingly the Legislature has ex-
pressed its intent that when conflicts arise in connection 
with negotiations between labor and management, 
unemployment compensation should not be available 
to support labor when it is a work stoppage, the respon-
sibility for which is chargeable to a strike initiated by 
labor.'' 
Under the provisions of the Utah Employment Security Act, 
the unemployment compensation funds are accumulated through 
employer contributions only. Although the Olof Nelson case 
was dealing with multi-unit bargaining organizations, we think 
the following quote from the Olof Nelson case is pertinent to 
this issue: 
nln these controversies where we have workers rep-
resented by their unions arrayed on one side against 
management in multi-unit bargaining organizations on 
the other, if we are to give effect to the Legislative pur-
pose and intent, the probletn simmers down to: Whose 
conduct is really responsible for the work stoppage? 
Answering this question may have its difficulties but it 
seems to be the only logical means of getting at the 
heart of the matter and resolving the conflict." 
The Court further states: 
CCThus, the critical fact to be determined is whether 
the conduct of labor or management is the primary and 
initiating cause of the work stoppage, or as phrased by 
1'1r. Justice Schauer in the McKinley case: ( ... It was 
proper to relate the responsibility for the work stop-
page to the party who created its actual and directly 
impelling cause.' " 
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We respectfully call the Court's attention to the follo•Ning 
cases which have dealt at some length with the problem of dis-
qualification during the existence of a work stoppage. 
Chrysler Corporation vs. Review Board of Indiana Etu-
ployment Security Division et al, 120 Ind. App. 425, 92 W.E. 
2d 565 ( 1950). This was an appeal from a decision of the 
appellate court that employees involved in a labor dispute were 
ineligible for unemployment insurance benefits during the \Vork 
v.reek following settlement of the strike, at least part of \vhich 
was reasonably required to prepare the plant for normal pro-
duction. 
The Court said at 568: 
((Where, as here, a labor dispute causes a work stop-
page and as a result of such stoppage it is necessary 
to make repairs before the plant can resume operations 
on a normal basis, employees involved in the labor 
dispute are not eligible for the benefits of the Act 
for unemployment during the time reasonably necessary 
to prepare the plant for normal operations. However, 
as stated by Judge Bowen of the Court in the case of 
Carnegie-Illinois Steel Corporation v. Review Board 
of Indiana Employment Security Division 1947, 117 
Ind. App. 3 79, 72 N.E. 2d 662, 667: (The test is not the 
resumption of operations by reason of the control or 
decision of the employer or conditions and speculative 
factors allegedly asserted by the employer. It must be 
limited to the delay directly and proximately caused 
by the labor dispute and the physical factors and con-
ditions created as the direct and natural consequences 
of the labor dispute.' " 
((Where the unemployment is originally caused by 
a labor dispute, before an employee will be entitled 
to the benefits of the Act, he has the burden of proving 
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his continued unemployment is not the result of the 
labor dispute but is caused by some other condition 
beyond his control. Frank Foundries Corporation v. 
Board of Review, etc., supra; Auker v. Review Board, 
Indiana Employment Security Division, 1947, 117 In-
diana Appellate 486, 494, 70 N.E. 2d 29, 71 N.E. 
2d 629 (transfer denied) ; Employees of Utah Fuel 
Company v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 1940, 
99 Utah 88, 104 P 2d 197. 
c·on the record before us in this case, the conclusion 
is inescapable that the employer did everything that 
was reasonably possible to promptly restore its plant 
to a normal production basis." 
Carnegie-Illinois Steel G'orp-oration v. 1~he Review Board 
of the Indiana Employment Security Division et al, 117 Ind. 
App. 379, 72 N.E. 2d 662. 
The Court held that where all production ceased on Janu-
ary 21, because of a strike, which terminated on February 18, 
and work was partially resumed on February 23, but was not 
fully resumed until March 16, employees were not entitled 
to unemployment benefits until March 16, since, until then, 
stoppage of work was ((because," which means <cby reason 
of" of a labor dispute within the Employment Security Act and 
concurrence of labor dispute and stoppage of work was un-
necessary. 
The Court cited from the brief of the union as follows: 
c CThe question before the court is whether a stoppage 
of work immediately subsequent to a labor dispute 
\vhich stoppage of work would not have occurred except 
(our italics) for the labor dispute disqualifies employees 
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In substance the instant case involves an identical issue. 
The Court quoted the Indiana Act: 
t( ( 3} An individual shall be ineligible for waiting 
period or benefit rights: ... for any week with respect 
to which the board finds that his total or partial or 
part-total unemployment is due to a stoppage of work 
which exists because of a labor dispute at the factory, 
establishment, or other premises at which he was last 
employed . . . " 
Deleted are certain escape provisions. 
The Court in discussing the matter as to whether the labor 
dispute and the stoppage tnust be both considered in the present 
tense stated: 
((There are two types of statutes in the states and 
territories of this country dealing with disqualifications 
for unemployment benefits. The one type such as the 
Wisconsin statute, which provides for disqualification 
for benefits, (for any week in which such strike or other 
bona fide labor dispute is in active progress (our italics) 
in the establishment in which he is or was last employed,' 
is in effect in a number of states. The other type is the 
one as is in effect in this state, and does not contain 
the words qr requirement that a strike be in active 
progress in order to disqualify a worker for benefits. 
Considering the legislative history of such enactments 
it is not unreasonable to assume that if the legislature 
of this state had intended to require that a strike be in 
active progress in order to disqualify a worker for 
benefits it would have enacted the active progress type 
of statute. Similarly we feel it is not unreasonable to 
assume that had the legislature intended that the stop-
page of 'vork and the labor dispute had to be coexistent 
it 'vould have made its intent clear through some ]an-
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guage such as the insertion of the word 'existing' 
following the words 'labor dispute' in the section in 
question.'' 
''The word 'because' in the statute means 'by reason 
of.' The legislature intended to disqualify workers 
for benefits where the stoppage of work was caused 
by a labor dispute under the conditions set forth in 
Section 7 (f) ( 3) of the Act even though such stoppage 
and dispute were not concurrent. The stoppage of work 
n1ust exist during the week for which benefits are 
claimed, but not necessarily during the existence of 
the labor dispute. 
"The only factors which could have caused the stop-
page of work as shown by the record were the condi-
tions in the plant which existed because of the shut-
down of the plant by reason of the labor dispute, and 
the time necessary to repair coke ovens, the hearths of 
blast furnaces, and other repair items necessary before 
production could be resumed after the shut-down. 
''We hold that the Review Board was in error, in 
its conclusion, that the unemployment following the 
settlement of the labor dispute and resulting from 
this fact was not due to a stoppage of work by a labor 
dispute. We further hold that . . . the Review Board 
was in error in concluding that a stoppage of work must 
exist at the same time, or concurrently, before a worker 
is disqualified.'' 
In Bako et al v. Unemployment Compensation Board of 
Review, 171 Pa. Supr. 222, 90 A 2d 309, the Court held that 
disqualification of the statute providing that employees shall 
be ineligible for compensation during a period of unemploy-
ment due to work stoppage as a result of a labor dispute is 
not limited to the time of the strike, but includes the period 
preceding the strike during which the employer curtails opera-
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tions to conserve property, and a reasonable period following 
the strike, until the plant can be returned to normal operations. 
See also American Steel Foundries v. Gordon et al, 404 
Ill. 174, 88 N.E. 2d 465; Fort Pitt Manufacturing Company 
v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 176 Pa. 
Supr. 162, 106 A 2d 672. 
The direct and impelling cause of the work stoppage 
which caused the unemployment for which benefits are claimed 
was the existence of the simultaneous strikes which involved 
all of the claimants who are appealing. While the members 
of Local 1438, International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers, failed to give timely notice of intention to strike to the 
state Labor Relations Board in time to ((legalize" their strike 
they were tton strike'' by reason of their withholding of their 
services by honoring the picket lines. This Court in the case 
of Gus P. Lexes et al vs. The Industrial Commission of Utah, 
243 P. 2d 964, stated: 
((Although the inquiry did not proceed upon the 
theory that claimants engaged in the strike, the un-
disputed facts show that this was the case. Neither the 
fact that they had no dispute with the employer, nor 
that their work stoppage was not called a strike, are 
controlling. A strike is generally defined to be a con-
certed action of employees in withholding services 
from their employer. Any such concerted action in 
refusing to perform services is a strike, no matter 
'vhat the action may be called, nor for whatever pur-
pose it may have been initiated." 
In the case of Pacific States Cast 11'on Pipe Co. v. Indus-
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''In Bodinson Mfg. Company vs. California Em-
ployment Commission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P 2d 935, 
the question was whether the applicant 'left his work 
because of a trade dispute.' Striking welders established 
a picket line through which applicant and others de-
clined to go. It appears there was only peaceful 
picketing and no threat of any kind. The Supreme 
Court of California held that as the applicant was not 
physically prevented from working, but he merely ex-
ercised the choice of following union principles by 
not going through the picket line, he was not out of 
work involuntarily and he was not eligible for unem· 
ployment compensation. In Re Persons Employed, etc. 
7 Washington 2d 580, 110 P 2d 877, the Court held 
that inasmuch as members of the union which did not 
call a strike agreed not to go through a picket line 
established by another union, they were thereby par-
ticipating in a labor dispute and there was no need for 
determining whether or not applicants were of the same 
'class' of workers as the strikers or whether they were 
employed in a separate unit of the company." 
The company determined that it was neither economically 
feasible nor safe to activate the company-owned power plant 
to supply power for the smelter and refinery in order to work 
off the stockpile of ore. Instead the company purchased the 
necessary power from public sources. The work stoppage at 
the establishment did not end until on or about February 6, 
1960. The electrical workers continued to honor picket lines 
except for those who obtained permits to cross the picket lines 
in order to do maintenance work as was arranged with the 
company. The continued unemployment of the power plant 
employees was due to their continuing to honor the picket 
lines and the lack of resumption of such operations which "'ould 
permit the economic and safe operation of the power plant. 
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With respect to the smelter workers, the stoppage of 
work, i.e. lack of normal or substantial operations, continued 
at the establishment even during the processing of the stock-
pile of ore. During the actual processing of the stockpile 
at the smelter the unernployment of the workers ceased. After 
the stockpile was processed the work stoppage which was due 
to the initial strike continued. The establishment could not 
resume operations until every local had settled and agreed 
to a resumption of work. If, as was pointed out in the Olof 
Nelson case, supra, 
((It was proper to relate the responsiblity for the 
work stoppage to the party who created its actual and 
directly impelling cause," 
then the claimants must be charged with the responsibility for 
the work stoppage both before and after the processing of the 
stockpile. There is no showing by the claimants that the con-
tinued work stoppage was due to anything other than the 
initial simultaneous strikes of the several unions. The com-
pany did not have the duty or the opportunity to resume 
operations on a normal or substantial basis until on or about 
February 6., 1960. When normal operations became possible, 
the company promptly recalled its workers. The evidence 
shows that the refinery could not operate in November when 
the recall began because of the deterioration which had taken 
place because of the strike-caused work stoppage. It was found 
that only a part of the refinery workers could be recalled 
due to such condition, and the rna jor portion of these were 
used in repair and maintenance to put the refinery back into 
a condition suitable for production. 
The \vork stoppage at the establishment ended for all 
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workers, including those represented by the International Union 
of Mine, ~fill and Smelter Workers and Office Employees' 
International union, on or about February 6, 1960; and, there-
fore, only workers not called back after that date can be con-
sidered e1 igible for benefits. 
Because the factual situation tn this case is unique due 
to the existence of many union bargaining groups, this is in 
part at least a case of first impression. We have a simultaneous 
strike or direct involvement in the strike by some eighteen 
different locals. After striking at the same time, the locals 
settled at different times. Because of the over-all unity of 
operations the failure of even the smallest local to reach a 
settlement prevented resumption of normal production and 
no general recall of workers could begin. The strike of no one 
local was any more the cause of the initial work stoppage 
than was the strike of any other or all other locals. Once the 
work stoppage commenced it could end only with a settlement 
by all. 
The Utah Act provides that the worker shall be ineligible 
for benefits during each week when: 
n ••• his unemployment is due to a stoppage of work 
which exists because of a strike involving his grade, 
class, or group . . . " 
There can be no denying that a stoppage of work existed at 
the establishment until February 6, 1960. In fact, the benefit 
claims of these claimants are based on that stoppage. The 
direct and impelling cause of the stoppage was the initial 
strike. Each of the claimants herein was involved in that strike. 
Being so involved, can he escape further disqualification 
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after his bargaining group has settled its issues and has ceased 
to be presently actively involved-keeping in mind that this 
was a concerted simultaneous strike action? While the evi-
dence does not conclusively show that there was a multi-
bargaining group identical to the Olof Nelson case, supra, 
there was a joint pre-strike presentation of demands and an 
after-strike publicity campaign-BR-235 (R. 004). The effect 
of these was to present a united front to create greater bargain-
tng pressure. 
In view of the decisions of this and other courts supra, 
it appears to be well settled that claimants are ineligible for 
benefits during the weeks when they are actively on strike; 
honoring picket lines; out of work because of repairs and 
maintenance made necessary by the strike; and when they 
are on vacation or are not available for work. Our principle 
concern then is with the claims which were filed after the 
respective contract settlement and for the weeks when none 
of these other disqualifying situations existed. The basic issue 
is whether or not the unemployment in these latter weeks was 
due to the action of the claimants themselves or whether it 
was, after contract settlement, existing only because of the 
failure of the other unions to reach settlements and whether 
or not the involven1ent of the claimants in the initial strike 
may be disregarded in order to allow benefits. 
We think that the better rule is that when members of 
one local union participate in a simultaneous strike the purpose 
of which is to cause a complete stoppage of \vork at the 
establishment such members should be disqualified from re-
ceiving unemployment compensation benefits during the 
period or periods when the employer is powerless to resume 
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operations because the members of one or more of such other 
striking unions remain on strike. 
There \Vas a sufficient joining of forces by the unions _______ _ 
___________________________________________________ _in presenting demands prior to 
the strike and advertising a united position during the strike 
___________ -------------- __________ -------------------------------- _____ to establish a joint 
responsibility for the work stoppage. Their actions made them 
a cohesive pressure group with all the claimants involved in 
the action causing the stoppage. At the time of the joint strike, 
the claimants were fully aware of the fact that normal opera-
tions could not be resumed at the establishment until all 
bargaining units had settled and were willing to return to 
work. In the face of this situation they joined with members 
of the other unions in the strike with each local union taking 
the proper strike vote and going on strike on August 10. 
The fact that the bargaining subsequent to the strike was 
continued by respective bargaining representatives does not 
remove the joint responsibility for the work stoppage which 
existed until February 6, 1960. Although the following quote 
from the Olaf Nelson case supra is not applicable in all 
respects to the instant case, it succinctly sets out the Court's 
view of the legislative intent of the statute in denying benefits 
to members of striking units. 
cc ••• The original provision passed in 1935 stated: 
(An employee shall not be entitled to benefits: _ .. 
( 3) If he has left or lost his employment due to a 
trade dispute involving the employer by whom he 
was employed, so long as such trade dispute con-
tinues, _ . . ' Ch. 38, Section 8 ( 3), Limitation on 
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c (The following year the statute was amended to read: 
(An individual shall be ineligible for benefits ... 
(d) For any week in which it is found by the com-
mission that his total or partial [total or partial, 
now deleted] unemployment is due to a stoppage of 
work which exists because of a strike involving his 
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or 
establishment at which he is or was last employed.' 
((Subdivision ( 1) was then added, which provides: 
elf the commission, upon investigation, shall find 
that a strike has been fomented by a worker of any 
employer, none of the workers of the grade, class, or 
group of workers of the individual who is found to 
be a party to such plan, or agreement to foment a 
strike, shall be eligible for benefits;' Ch. 1, Sec. 5, 
Disqualification for Benefits; Laws of Utah, Special 
Session 1936. 
CCW e do not believe that the amendment in 1936 was 
intended to change the fundamental theory of dis-
qualification stated in the 1935 act. The amendment 
was designed to refine and clarify the disqualification 
prov1s1on. Expression of this theory of ineligibility 
was no easy matter. The emphasis in the original pro-
vision is that no benefits were to be paid where the 
unemployn1ent was due to a trade dispute involving 
the employer of the claimant. The 1936 amendment 
substituted the words: (work stoppage caused by a 
strike' for (trade dispute' and (involving his grade, 
class or group of workers at the factory or establish-
ment at which he is or was last employed' for (involving 
the employer by whom he was last employed.' It makes 
no difference whether the principle of disqualification 
is expressed in terms, relating to the employer or the 
employee. In order to have a trade dispute involving 
the employer, or a strike involving the grade, class or 
group of workers, there must exist an employment 
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relationship. In both the 1935 and 1936 versions of 
disqualification, it is the temporary termination of the 
employment relationship which is being described. The 
purpose of adding sub-division ( 1) was to make it 
clear that the meaning of the 19 3 5 act was not to be 
changed. Benefits were not to be paid where a strike 
or trade dispute involved either the employer or the 
grade, class, or group of workers at their place of 
employment, in such a way as to cause the unemploy-
ment or work stoppage. None of the workers of the 
grade, class or group of workers of the individual who 
is found to be a party to such plan or agreement to 
foment a strike shall be eligible for benefits. 
"This construction of these two provisions, 42-2a-5 
(d) and (d) ( 1) is consistent with the interpretation 
given them in Members Iron Workers Union of Provo 
v. Ind. Comm., 104 Utah 242, 139 P. 2d 208. In that 
case, the Iron Workers Union was defeated in an 
election which certified the rival Steel Workers Or-
ganizing Committee (S. W. 0. C.) as the bargaining 
agent at the Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Co. The 
S. W. 0. C. called a strike . .1-lthough the members of 
the Iron Workers' Union did not participate in the 
strike vote, they refused to cross the picket line and 
subsequently sought unemployment compensation bene-
fits. Mr. Justice McDonough, speaking for this court, 
at page 2 52 of the U tab Reporter, stated: 
(If a strike involves his ((grade, class or group'· 
of workers, an employee is ineligible to unemploy-
ment benefits when stoppage of work is ((caused" 
by members thereof. The words ugrade" and Hclass" 
have reference generally to the type of work being 
performed, as to skills or as to expertness in those 
skills. The word ((group" may be synonymous in 
a given instance with ((class or grade", but it may 
include several classes or grades or even involve the 
vvorkers of an entire plant. A strike involves the 
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((grade, class, or group" of an employee within the 
meaning of the statute if the dispute which results 
in the strike is with reference to wages, hours or 
conditions of employment of a group of which he is 
a member . . . The provisions of (d) ( 1) herein-
above quoted, providing that where a strike is fo-
mented by an employee, the workers who are of his 
((grade, class, or group" are ineligible for benefits 
serves to make clear that the construction here given 
of the quoted words voices the legislative intent. 
It is not only those who foment the strike or bring 
it abottt who are ineligible, but the group to which 
such persons belong-however inclusive-the group 
for whose benefit the strike is called.' (Italics added". 
CONCLUSION 
We think that the legislative intent to disqualify claimants 
who go on a strike from receiving unemployment compensation 
benefits during the entire work stoppage or until there is a 
showing that after a certain date the work stoppage was in no 
way connected with the initial strike. 
We respectfully submit, therefore, that the Commission 
and the Board of Review did not err in denying unemployment 
compensation benefits to the claimants herein. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
PARSONS, BEHLE, EVANS & MOFFAT 
Attorneys for Kennecott Copper Corporation 
ELLIOTT W. EVANS 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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